Realism and Psychological Science by David J. F. Maree

Author:David J. F. Maree
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030451431
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Human Nature Militating Against Positivism

Before we come to the main constructionist thrust I would like to recruit for science, we need to discuss the human characteristics that exempts psychosocial science from positivist analysis. The major focus of Gergen’s (1982) criticism of positivist-empiricist sciences is based on the changing nature of human beings, the interpretive nature of human reality and the linguistic nature of humanity.(a)Inconstancy of human nature

In countering the behavioural scientists’ search for laws, durability and tendencies in human behaviour, Gergen (1982) motivates its impossibility at length by stressing the inconstancy of human behaviour. It is forever changing, free, no two acts are ever the same and human beings have the unlimited capacity to choose, create and change at will. How on earth can one through the aeons of human history find semblances of similar behaviour that can point to certain repetitive streaks in humans? According to Gergen the putative perceived similarities are merely that, namely, hastily drawn conclusions based on coincidental observation. To take an extreme example, if one observes cooperative behaviour between ants and at some stage observe similar behaviour in groups of humans, does this warrant the inference of a general principle governing groups of organism? Probably not, and the social researcher should indeed heed Gergen’s (1982, p. 50) warning that coincidental observed similarities between groups, theories and cultures (like shade-sitting behaviour) do not constitute laws or tendencies. Granted, Gergen (1982) restricts his examples carefully to (a) the search for universal patterns of behaviour based on so-called similarities between theories and cultures; (b) the construction of models of behaviour (which implies that the ability to construct such a model does not mean the patterns or tendencies are real—recall the ant example above); (c) correlating a large number of variables across groups, populations and cultures where the existence of correlations often are interpreted as indicating stable patterns of cross-group behaviour and characteristics. However, given the empirical scientist’s investigation of universal behaviour, the abstract notion of universal behaviour should correspond to observable instances of such behaviour. There should be correspondence rules connecting the abstract concept and the observable—

without such correspondence rules, the concept of universals is without empirical content. Yet, if human activity is undergoing continuous change, if cultures develop novel patterns of action over time, then systems of correspondence rules are constantly threated by obsolescence (Gergen, 1982, p. 55).

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.